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Speedy Trial Rights For Florida's Juveniles: A Survey
of Recent Interpretations by Florida Courts
"Delay of justice is injustice."1 This maxim is embodied in the Bill
of Rights2 and in Florida's Constitution: 3 it is implemented by the fed-
eral government's Speedy Trial Act of 1974" and by Florida's Rules of
Criminal and Juvenile Procedure.5 The right to a speedy trial is incor-
porated into the statutory provisions or court rules of the fifty states
and the District of Columbia.6
This note provides a practical interpretive guide to Florida's un-
derstanding of juvenile rights to a speedy determination when a juve-
nile is accused of a delinquent act.7 It compares and contrasts pertinent
provisions of Florida's Juvenile Justice Act8 with state court rules to
show 1) how the act's language has been interpreted; 2) the results
reached through these interpretations; and 3) how differing fact pat-
terns and rapidly changing law can produce ambiguous precedent.9 In
order to facilitate understanding the importance of juvenile rights in
the context of speedy resolution of pending charges, a brief background
. Walter Savage Landor (1775-1864), an English poet, essayist and novelist.
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
3. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3161-74 (1976).
5. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180 (1981).
6. See Poulos & Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Stan-
dard in Search of a Statehouse. 28 HASTINGS L.J. 353, 376 n.53 (1976).
7. In 1950, the Florida Constitution was amended to define violations of law by
children as "acts of delinquency" rather than as crimes. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15. The
new constitution adopted in 1968 preserved this juvenile court concept and philosophy.
Id.
8. The short title of chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes covering proceedings re-
lating to juveniles, FLA. STAT. § 39.05, the speedy trial right, was amended in 1981.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180, as amended, became effective Jan. 1, 1981.
9. The diligent practitioner must be alert to the subtle and frequent changes in
the language of the juvenile statutes and rules which could render relatively current
decisions inapplicable because they were based on language in effect at the time of the
offense.
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of the historic speedy trial guarantee to all criminally accused will be
given. 10
The United States Supreme Court recognized the diverse functions
served by speedy trials. Speedy trials are an important safeguard
against oppressive pre-trial incarceration and an effective means for
minimizing anxiety accompanying public accusation. Speedy trials
limit impairment of an accused's defenses to the extent impairment re-
sults from lost witnesses or fading memories.11 The Court has also
stressed societal interests at stake in securing an accused's speedy trial;
preventing overwhelming case bacdogs which enable defendants to ne-
gotiate pleas to lesser offenses and curtailing the accused's opportunity
to commit other crimes if free on bond while awaiting trial.12
The United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision Barker
v. Wingo,1 established a framework for guidelines to assist courts in
determining when trial delay violated a defendant's constitutional right
to speedy trial. 4 The Court declined to set precise limits, believing this
function more appropriate for legislatures. In Florida, both the legisla-
ture and supreme court delineated these speedy trial limits for
juveniles. 15
The language of Florida's juvenile rules appears unambiguous.
Uncertainty develops when the language of the rules and the language
of their legislative counterpart conflict,16 or when situations not ex-
pressly resolved by the language of either arise. These circumstances
necessitate consideration of persuasive authority, most often found in
10. Juveniles in Florida were not granted the speedy trial right until 1973 when
chapter 39 was revised to reflect the procedural mandates of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). The creation of shorter time limits than due process required was based on the
theory that the juvenile justice system should operate swiftly. See generally CONTINU-
ING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, FLA. Juv. L. & PRAC. (1979) for
history and development of the juvenile system in Florida.
1I. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
12. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
13. Id.
14. Relevant factors include the length of delay, the reason for delay, assertion of
defendant's right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530.
15. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(a) (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(a) (1981).
16. Compare FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(e) (1981) with FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6)
(1981). For discussion of this conflict, see infra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying
text.
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the language and interpretation of analogous criminal procedure rules
used in adult court.1 7 This need for logical persuasive case law is prob-
lematic since Florida courts traditionally adhere to the philosophy that
"juveniles constitute a special and distinct class of citizens with partic-
ularized needs to be afforded unique treatment by the state."' 8 If
juveniles are in fact deserving of "unique treatment" it is arguable that
decisions and procedures adopted in adult criminal cases are inapplica-
ble and inappropriate for juvenile delinquency cases despite factual
similarities.' 9
During its 1981 session the legislature substantially revised Flor-
ida's Juvenile Justice Act.20 These revisions, the most significant since
the Act's major overhaul in 1978,21 call for harsher treatment of juve-
nile offenders. They are the legislature's response to public alarm over
rise in juvenile crime. They may also protend serious erosion of the
enhanced procedural benefits currently afforded juveniles. The avowed
purpose of the Act is to assure all children "the care, guidance, and
control, preferably in each child's own home, which will best serve the
moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child and the
best interests of the state. '2 2 The delicate balance between the interests
of the state and the interests of the child is threatened now that one
interest is gaining preeminence. Earlier provisions, now more severe,
permit serious and repeat offenders to be removed from the juvenile
system and treated as adults in all respects. 23 Florida courts must re-
17. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (1981).
18. A.D.T. v. State, 318 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
19. See L.G. v. State, 405 So. 2d 252, 253 n.3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(availability requirement of adult criminal rule not pertinent to juvenile rule); In re
D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980) (delinquency proceedings exist to remove children
from the adult criminal justice system and punish them in a manner suitable and ap-
propriate for children); G.A. v. State, 391 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (expressed state policy of treating juvenile offenders differently from adult
offenders).
20. See Evans, Juvenile Justice: The Legislature Revisits Chapter 39, 55 FLA.
B.J. 697 (1981).
21. Ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla. Laws 1318-66.
22. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(b) (1981).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(c)(3) (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.150(b)
(1981) (providing for waiver to adult court of a child fourteen or older under certain
circumstances); FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981) (granting authority and discretion
439 1
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main alert to jealously safeguard the distinctive rights of those minors
who remain within the juvenile system. Otherwise, the longstanding
objectives of juvenile court-rehabilitation and restitution rather than
punishment and retribution 2 -- could be sacrificed to appease public an-
ger with the juvenile system.
Supporting the view that the unique aspects of juvenile courts
should be preserved, the remainder of this note will examine the unset-
tled "speedy rights"2 5 guaranteed juveniles and suggest possible ave-
nues for resolving exisiting conflicts.
When the Speedy Right Attaches
Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.180(a)26 Time. Every case in
which a petition has been filed alleging a child to be delinquent or
dependent shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing without de-
mand within ninety (90) days or the earlie(r) of the following
dates:
(1) The date the child was taken into custody.
(2) The date the petition was filed."'
to the prosecutor to file a charge directly in the adult criminal division if the child is
sixteen or seventeen and public interest requires adult sanctions be considered); FLA.
STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981) (providing for grand jury indictment of a child, regardless
of age, if the crime is punishable by death or life imprisonment).
24. G.A., 391 So. 2d at 722 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966))
and FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2) (Supp. 1978).
25. The term "speedy rights" will hereinafter be used since a corresponding right
to a timely-filed instrument of accusation, unique to juveniles, will also be discussed.
Provisions of FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180 (1981) not dealt with in this note are the effect of a
mistrial or order of a new trial (8.180(e)) and the exemption from the rule for perma-
nent commitments of children for adoption or placement in a licensed agency
(8.180(f)). These subsections have remained unchanged and virtually unchallenged
since they provide few grounds for controversy.
26. The corresponding FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(a) (1981) reads: "If a petition has
been filed alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act, the adjudicatory hear-
ing on the petition shall be commenced within 90 days of the earlier of the following
dates: .... " (The remainder is identical to the rule).
27. A petition is the accusatory instrument equivalent to the adult information
and is filed in the same fashion by the state attorney. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 140(b)
which reads: "The indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried
shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constitut-
ing the offense charged." The distinctive vocabulary used for juveniles further symbol-
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/2
6:1982 Speedy Trial Rights for Florida Juveniles 441 1
Unlike the corresponding adult criminal speedy trial rule, the juve-
nile speedy trial rule does not distinguish between misdemeanors and
felonies in setting time limits.28 Nor is the juvenile rule invoked by de-
fendant's demand.29
There are several reasons why swift resolution of pending charges
are especially important to this age group. Adolescents are in the midst
of rapid developmental changes.30 Any enforced delay during a critical
stage of their learning process can have serious deleterious conse-
quences on their ability to mature into responsible adults.31 It is well
established that the efficacy of discipline is a function of its timing.32
Another forceful argument against unnecessarily prolonged exposure to
the adjudicatory process is the strong influence that peers have on a
child's behavior and the possibility of corruption due to association with
delinquents in the system 3 Where an innocent child is mistakenly held
accountable for the delinquent act of another, the stigmatizing effect
can be devastating unless corrected with all possible speed. Where a
izes the intent that they should not be treated as criminals nor dealt with by the pro-
cess used for criminals. Other changes include: summons instead of warrant, finding of
involvement or adjudication instead of conviction, disposition instead of sentence, com-
munity control instead of probation.
28. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(1) (1981) provides a 90-day limit for misdemean-
ors and 180 days for felonies.
29. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(2) (1981) requires a trial within 60 days upon
motion by a defendant demanding it. This aspect of the juvenile rule is disadvantageous
to those juveniles who have previously waived their speedy trial rights and now wish to
proceed swiftly but have no procedural mechanism to reactivate them.
30. L. Kohlberg & R.B. Kramer, Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood
and Adult Moral Development, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 12, 93-120 (1969).
31. Id.
32. R. Walters, R. Park & V. Cane, Timing of Punishment and the Observation
of Consequences to Others as Determinants of Response Inhibition, J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY, 2, 10-30 (1965).
33. In 1966, a study of peer influence was conducted by the behavioral research
team of Costanzo and Shaw. They asked children to compare the lengths of a pair of
lines, one line obviously longer than the other. All but one of the children were confed-
erates of the investigators and were told to choose the incorrect line. The child who was
not a confederate altered his own judgment, denying evidence of his senses, and agreed
with the obvious incorrect judgment of the group to conform with his peers. P. Co-
stanzo & M. Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age Level, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 37,
967-975 (1966).
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guilty child is appropriately held accountable for his own delinquent
act, he is equally disserved by learning that justice may be thwarted by
dilatory tactics.
The time in which the adjudicatory hearing must be held begins to
run at the earlier of two events: when the child is taken into custody or
when a petition is filed by the state attorney.34 What constitutes "taken
into custody" has been a source of confusion to prosecutors, defense
lawyers and trial judges in determining the moment the speedy trial
right is triggered. The Juvenile Justice Statute defines the phrase
"taken into custody" as "the status of a child immediately when tem-
porary physical control over the child is attained by a person author-
ized by law, pending the child's release, detention, placement, or other
disposition as authorized by law." 5 Notwithstanding the "plain" lan-
guage of the statute, three district courts of appeal have reached dispa-
rate results when asked to determine when custody begins.
In D.L.M. v. State,s a nine-year-old child was seen emerging from
a house that was burglarized. He was apprehended by the police, taken
back to the house where he was identified by a witness, and then re-
leased to his parents. He was not formally arrested until thirty days
later. The Third District Court of Appeal held that these facts did not
constitute custody within the meaning of the rule.37 Instead of using
the definition set out by the juvenile statute, which might have led logi-
cally to the conclusion that the child had been in temporary physical
control of one authorized by law, the court sought guidance from the
committee note tracing the history of the Florida Rule of Juvenile Pro-
cedure pertaining to speedy trial. Finding that the present rule "evolved
from the criminal speedy trial Rule 3.191, and looking to interpreta-
tions under that rule,"3 8 the court determined that the actions of the
police officers did not constitute "custody", since the criminal standard
is defined as "arrest".39
34. This occurs most frequently when a child was not apprehended at the time of
the offense but a complaint was filed againt him at a later date.
35. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(32) (1981).
36. 397 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
37. Id. at 440.
38. Id.
39. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(4) (1981) has an explicit provision defining cus-
tody as arrest or summons. Juvenile rules, however, differ in purpose and intent. See
1442 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reached the same result us-
ing a different analysis in State v. C.B..40 This was a consolidated ap-
peal by the state seeking reversal of three juvenile dismissals where the
juveniles were taken into custody but released the same day.41 Al-
though the court looked first to the statutory definition of custody
found in Chapter 39, it based its finding on a subsection of the statute
in effect at that time which said, "the person taking the child into cus-
tody and detaining the child shall, within 3 days, make a written report
to the appropriate intake officer,.... .42 From this language the court
surmised that the legislature intended to limit speedy time application
to cases where a juvenile was actually detained for a period of time
rather than being released immediately after being taken into custody.
That analysis is no longer valid in light of the legislature's deletion of
those words in its 1981 revision of Chapter 39.43
In G.A. v. State,44 a juvenile shot and killed his mother. The First
District Court of Appeal ordered the boy discharged, finding his cus-
tody effected by law enforcement officers who exercised temporary
physical control by detaining him for questioning before he was re-
leased to a family member.4 5 Instead of filing a delinquency petition
the state attorney immediately sought, without success, a grand jury
indictment for murder.4 When the delinquency petition finally was
filed, it was 26 days beyond the statutory custody limit which, as the
appellate court ultimately found, attached at the time G.A. was first
questioned.4 7
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.010 (1981) which mandates that the juvenile rules are to be used
under the Florida Juvenile Justice Act (chapter 39).
40. 401 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
41. Id. at 920.
42. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(2) (1979).
43. Effective July 1, 1981.
44. 391 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
45. Id. at 723. The officer testified that G.A. would not have been allowed to
leave the premises had he attempted to do so before the questioning was completed.
46. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981). An indictment can be returned against a
child of any age who commits an offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment.
The child is then tried and handled in all respects as if he were an adult. If the grand
jury returns a no true bill or fails to act within 21 days, the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction and may proceed as it would in any other case.
47. 391 So. 2d at 724.
4431
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The precise meaning to be given "custody" has not been illumi-
nated by these cases; rather they illustrate the term's elusive nature.
These diverse results suggest a case by case approach is necessary in
determining the custody question, since investigatory questioning by
police officers should not always be viewed as equivalent to custody.
Nevertheless, the anxiety accompanying accusation by an authority
figure and the unique vulnerability of minor children require strict in-
terpretation of the definition set out by the legislature in Chapter 39 to
assure that, in those instances where a child is under physical control of
a law enforcement officer and is not free to leave at any time, the
speedy provisions of the statutes and rules are activated.
The Juvenile Right to a Speedy Accusation
On a question certified to the Florida Supreme Court in S.R. v.
State,48 the court expressly ruled that timely filing of the charging in-
strument is a substantive right guaranteed juveniles by statute.49 Com-
monly called the 45-day rule, this uniquely juvenile right,50 closely re-
48. 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977).
49. Id. at 1019. The tangential issue of substantive versus procedural rights has
significant impact on decisions reached when the statutes and the rules conflict. How-
ever, a discussion of this is beyond the scope of this note. See M.G. v. State, 404 So. 2d
420 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), State v. L.H., 392 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), S.M. v. State, 398 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), State v.
G.B.P., 399 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) and P.L.H. v. Brownlee, 389
So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) for the diverse treatment given this question
by the five district courts of appeal.
50. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(1)-(7) (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(a)(1)-(3)
(1981). There is no adult rule or statutory counterpart, nor is there a constitutional
equivalent. The United States Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment
speedy trial right is inapplicable to the period prior to arrest or filing of formal charges,
but that due process may still require dismissal if delay was purposeful and caused
substantial prejudice to the defense. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
There are also some statutes of limitations on pre-arrest or pre-filing delays, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3282 providing a five year limit on the filing of federal charges. See also U.S.
v. MacDonald, - U.S. __., 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982) reversing the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' dismissal based on violation of MacDonald's speedy trial rights
under the sixth amendment (MacDonald v. U.S., 632 F.2d 258 (1980)). This cele-
brated murder case involved an army doctor accused of killing his wife and two daugh-
ters. He was arrested but the charges were dismissed. Five years later the grand jury
8
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lated to the speedy trial right, mandates dismissal with prejudice if a
petition is not filed within 45 days of a specified event. Potential con-
flict exists since the statute triggers the timeclock's start when the child
is "taken into custody"; 51 the juvenile rules require filing a petition
within 45 days from the date the complaint is referred to the "intake
office".52 The intake office is the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services (HRS). HRS personnel are responsible for interviewing
the juvenile with his parents or guardian and recommending appropri-
ate disposition of the charge (i.e., judicial or non-judicial treatment) to
the state attorney.
Conflict could be avoided if, as suggested before, the statutory
"custody" provision is triggered once control over the child is effected
by a law enforcement officer, despite immediate release of the child to
his parent or guardian. This would logically resolve any remaining in-
consistency since the rule would apply only to those clearly non-custo-
dial situations. Both the rule and the statute permit a fifteen day exten-
sion upon motion by the state attorney.'0
Whether the 45-day rule applies to those 16 or 17-year-old
juveniles charged by information directly in the criminal division of the
circuit court remains unclear." In State v. Puckett" the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that the 45-day rule did not apply to an
information filed against a juvenile who was to be prosecuted as an
adult. Puckett sought and won dismissal in the trial court, arguing that
Florida Statute § 39.05(6), which requires timely filing of a juvenile
petition, existed prior to Statute § 39.04(2)(e) which permits the state
indicted him; he was tried and convicted. Chief Justice Burger wrote that once charges
are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable.
51. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1981).
52. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(e) (1981).
53. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6), as amended in 1981, substituted "for good cause
shown" for the original wording "when in the opinion of the court additional time is
justified because of exceptional circumstances." FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(e) (1981) re-
tains the statute's original language.
54. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981) gives the state attorney authority to file
an information if in his judgment the public interest requires that adult sanctions be
considered or imposed. For a discussion of this provision, see Comment, Prosecutorial
Waiver of Juveniles Into Adult Criminal Court: The Ends of Justice... Or the End
of Justice? State v. Cain, 5 NOVA L.J. 487 (1981).
55. 384 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
4451
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attorney to file an adult information."8 In reversing and reinstating the
information, the appellate court reasoned by negative inference that
since both statutes were amended in the same session, 57 if the legisla-
ture meant to include the filing of informations within the 45-day pe-
riod it would have so specified. 58
In contrast to Puckett, the First District Court of Appeal in LH. v.
State9 equated an information with a petition for purposes of the 45-
day rule where a sixteen-year-old burglary suspect had successfully
transferred his case from the criminal division back to juvenile court.60
The juvenile appealed on the ground that no petition had been filed in
the juvenile division within 45 days as required by statute and there-
fore, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter. The appel-
late court pointed out that "the information filed in adult court was
authorized by statute and gave the adult court jurisdiction over the
cause. By the same token, the transfer to juvenile court was authorized
by the same statute and gave the juvenile court jurisdiction." 61 The
court held that while a juvenile has a substantive right to have the
charge dismissed if it is untimely filed, the information could serve as
the petition, though better practice would call for a petition to be sub-
stituted for the information. 62 Since the information was filed against
I.H. within a week after he was taken into custody, timeliness posed no
problem, but it can be inferred that had it not been filed within the 45
days, the appellate court would have granted the dismissal.
56. Id.
57. Ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla. Laws 1334 amended FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) to allow
45 days rather than the previous 30 days.
58. 384 So. 2d at 661.
59. 405 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
60. On motion of a child, if he can show he has not previously been convicted of
two delinquent acts, one of which is a felony, he must be returned to the juvenile court
for prosecution. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1979). The 1981 revision of this subsec-
tion permits return to juvenile court only for those sixteen or seventeen-year-olds who
are charged with a misdemeanor and do not have the prior record.
61. 405 So. 2d at 452.
62. Id. at 453. As this note went to press the Fourth District Court of Appeal
decided State v. D.C.W., No. 81-1699 (filed Sept. 1, 1982). The court held that the 45-
day rule is not activated until the accused is transferred to the juvenile division. Id.
D.C.W. involved a juvenile originally indicted on an offense that was later reduced
making him eligible for juvenile court treatment.
10
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The 45-day rule was not raised in State v. Perez,63 where two
juveniles were being held as adults on other charges but were re-ar-
rested for the commission of a sexual assault at the Dade County jail.
The information on this new charge was not filed until 90 days had
lapsed. They moved for a discharge on the ground that as juveniles
they had the right to be brought to trial within ninety days of their
arrest." The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the discharge
holding that the juvenile's speedy trial rights had vested, "and until
such time as the State notifies a juvenile that he is to be considered as
an adult as to certain charges, the juvenile has the right to rely on the
statutes and the rules that protect him in the status of a juvenile."' 5
Implicitly, the 45-day rule is one of those protections.
In view of S.R. v. State6' it can be argued that until the juvenile
court is divested of its jurisdiction over a juvenile, the state must not
deny any juvenile substantive rights to which he is entitled. If this ar-
gument is accepted, the state must file an information on any juvenile
to be prosecuted in adult court within 45 days of arrest or risk
dismissal.
The Dismissal Sanction
The language in Chapter 39 and the Juvenile Rule pertaining to
dismissal for violation of the speedy trial right are identical. Both
provide:
If the adjudicatory hearing is not begun within ninety days or an
extension thereof as hereinafter provided, the petition shall be dis-
missed with prejudice.6"
Neither the statute nor the rule require a motion by the defendant to
activate this provision.68 Thus, it appears not only to be mandatory, but
63. 400 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
64. Id. at 94. They had not yet been found guilty of their other crimes which
would activate section 39.02(5)(d) (stating that once a child is found guilty of a crime
as an adult he shall thereafter be handled as an adult for subsequent crimes).
65. Id.
66. 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977).
67. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(b) (1981); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(b) (1981).
68. Compare with the 45-day rule. Both FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(e) (1981) and
447 1
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automatic. Once the outer limit has expired a juvenile court has no
choice but to discharge the defendant.69
When the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo70 set
forth the four elements that are to be balanced against each other on a
case by case basis in order to determine a defendant's constitutional
right to speedy trial, it also lamented "the unsatisfactorily severe rem-
edy of dismissal" when that right had been deprived .7 The Court went
on to say: "This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that
a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free."7 2 In
Barker the Court found that there had been no denial of speedy trial
even though the delay had been well over five years.
Certainly the mandated dismissal in consequence of exceeding
much stricter statutory or rule-determined lirpits for juveniles must
trouble lower courts even more so. Nevertheless, the dismissal sanction,
whether procedural or constitutional, serves the goal speedy trial is
designed to effectuate-a system disposing of cases with reasonable dis-
patch. Although sometimes both prosecutors and defendants perceive
speed as antagonistic to their interest, 3 there is the public's interest in
maximizing the deterrent effect of prosecution7 4 and in minimizing the
considerable costs of lengthy pretrial detention. 5 Delay of justice also
diminishes victims' respect for the judicial system, especially if victims
perceive the slow process as concern for only the defendant. Victims
FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1981) start with the words "On motions by or in behalf of a
child. . . .
69. Compare with FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(1) (1981) for adults which specifi-
cally provide for a motion for discharge. Moreover, subsection (d)(3) requires the trial
court to make a complete inquiry of possible reasons to deny discharge.
70. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See State v. Bonamy, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 421 (5th
Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1982) for Florida's application of the Barker guidelines.
71. Id. at 522.
72. Id.
73. This is often the situation where a defendant wants to wait and see the out-
come of a co-defendant's separate trial, hoping for an acquittal so he may not be tried.
Barker was such a case.
74. Footnote 8 in Barker referred to a 1968 estimate that over 70% of those
arrested in Washington D.C. for robbery and released prior to trial were rearrested
while on bail.
75. Overcrowded conditions and spiraling costs of running detention centers and
holding facilities are nationwide problems.
1448 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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and witnesses are further angered and inconvenienced when required to
make repeated trips to court due to continuances and other delaying
devices.
Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights
Presumably the harsh realities of the dismissal sanction have man-
ifested in a liberalizing trend regarding exceptions to the speedy right.
This is evident on both national 6 and state levels.7 Generous interpre-
tations of waiver, extension and exclusion provisions make the speedy
countdown appear a flexible restraint. The exceptions are ambiguous in
some situations, creating traps for the unwary. One potential pitfall in
Florida's juvenile rules is misuse of its new waiver provision, which
states simply: "In a delinquency proceeding the child may voluntarily
waive his right to a speedy trial."78
The waiver provision became effective January 1, 1981, and no
appellate decisions have yet construed the rule. The only statutory ref-
erence to waiver of speedy trial is in the section of the Act entitled
Hearings, which says in part: "The right to a speedy trial shall be gov-
erned by the provisions of § 39.05(7), but such right may be volunta-
rily waived by the child in accordance with the Florida Rules of Juve-
nile Procedure."7 (Emphasis supplied). There is no corresponding
provision in the rules of criminal procedure.80
On its face the new provision would favor the conclusion that an
affirmative act by the child is necessary to effectuate a waiver. The
inclusion of the word voluntary should preclude any automatic or un-
76. See Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-43, 93 Stat.
327. For commentary on these amendments, see Misner, The 1979 Amendments to the
Speedy Trial Act: Death of the Planning Process, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1981).
77. See Poulos & Coleman, supra note 6, at 378-79.
78. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(c) (1981).
79. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(a) (1981).
80. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(2) (1981) and 1980 committee note I declare that
the terms waiver, tolling, or suspensions have no meaning within the context of the
section as amended. The section addresses extensions for a specified period of time. The
juvenile rules retain the term "tolling" in one subsection only - when a child intends
to plead insanity as a defense. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.170(b)(2) (1981) provides that when a
continuance is granted for the purpose of an examination it will "toll the speedy time
rule."
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knowing waiver of speedy time without the child's express acquies-
cence.81 It has been determined that silence or inaction by an adult
defendant does not constitute waiver.82
The accused (whether adult or juvenile) has no duty to bring on
his own trial.83 Nevertheless, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
A.F. v. Nourse8 4 reluctantly discharged the juvenile when defense
counsel stood by without objection to the setting of the adjudicatory
hearing beyond the ninety-day limit. The court held it was bound by
Stuart v. State85 inasmuch as the Florida Supreme Court refused to
equate waiver with defense's failure to point out that the trial date ex-
ceeded speedy limits. 8  Moreover, Judge Hersey, though concurring
with the result reached by the majority in A.F., expressed dismay: "De-
fense counsel, after all remains an officer of the court. . . .Counsel
should not be encouraged to invite error. . . or acquiesce in error. So-
ciety, as well as an individual accused, has rights which merit our at-
tention.1187 The new waiver provision may be more liberally applied in
future decisions if Judge Hersey's displeasure with such defense tactics
is shared among the judiciary.
The ramifications of waiver in the context of the defense motion
for continuance are also unresolved. The Florida Supreme Court in
Butterworth v. Fluellen88 allowed an adult defendant's motion for con-
tinuance to be treated as a waiver of the speedy trial rule. The Fluellen
court held that once the motion was granted, the limitation set out by
the criminal rule was no longer applicable and only federal and Florida
constitutional guarantees remained.8 9 This ruling seems inappropriate
for juveniles, however, since adults retain the right to demand trial
within sixty days, a right unavailable to juveniles. The better practice
would be for the trial court to cite a defense continuance as one reason
81. It cannot be presumed that the Florida Supreme Court would include the
word without intending that it be given full force and effect.
82. State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
83. Dickey v. Fla., 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
84. 383 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
85. 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
86. Id.
87. 383 So. 2d at 759.
88. 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980).
89. Id. at 970.
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for extension of the time for speedy trial rather than as an automatic
"voluntary" waiver by the juvenile.
The waiver provision is most appropriate when non-judicial ac-
tions, such as diversionary programs,90 are employed to resolve minor
infractions best settled out of court. If the infraction cannot be resolved
in this matter the juvenile's charge should not be dismissed for lack of
time to prosecute. Once the juvenile voluntarily waives speedy trial, the
question arises as to whether a new ninety-day period starts to run9 or
whether, under the Fluellen rationale, only the defendant's constitu-
tional rights remain.
Extension of Speedy Time
Florida's juvenile rule and its juvenile statute substantially agree
in their provisions for extending time:
The court may extend the period of time . . . on motion of any
party, after hearing, on a finding that the interest of justice will be
served by such extension. The order will recite the reasons for such
extension. The general congestion of the court's docket, lack of dili-
gent preparation, or failure to obtain available witnesses or other
avoidable or foreseeable delays shall not constitute grounds for
such extension.92
These sections, ostensibly specific and straightforward in their
mandatory language, have been the crux of numerous appeals.93
90. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.0333 (1981) authorizing community arbitration as
an alternative to judicial action.
91. This issue was settled for criminal defendants by the Fluellen court, but as
stated earlier, adults retain their right under the Rules of Criminal Procedure to de-
mand a trial within 60 days.
92. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(d) (1981). FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(c) (1981) differs
only in requiring a finding of good cause or that the interest of the child will be served.
93. See C.S. v. State, 390 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (oral contin-
uance does not extend speedy time. The court must have a finding with reasons cited
and an order); M.M. v. State, 407 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (lack of
written order cannot be cured after time expires); J.R.S. v. Hastings, 374 So. 2d 559
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (must enter order and cite reasons for extension); R.L.P.
v. Korda, 380 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (oral continuance on the
court's own motion does not extend speedy time); M.B. v. Lee, 318 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.
451[11 6:1982
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In clear, unequivocal language three actions are required of the
trial judge: 1) that he conduct a hearing,94 2) that he make a finding of
cause, and 3) that he issue an order reciting the reasons for extension.
The language precludes justifying extensions for the normally avoidable
reasons. By the specific language of both the rule and statute, exten-
sions must be in the "interest of justice" or "the interest of the child. ' 95
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal appeared to reach the
same conclusion in M.B. v. Lee.98 In this case it was unclear whether
the juvenile had made an oral motion for continuance, but the court
stated that even if he had, he was still entitled to dismissal since the
trial judge failed to enter an order reciting the reasons for extension.9"
As discussed earlier" it is an unsettled question whether the crimi-
nal or the juvenile procedural clock applies when juveniles are certified
to be tried as adults. In State v. Benton9" the Florida Supreme Court
held that the criminal speedy time limitation of 180 days begins to run
from the time a juvenile is taken into custody, regardless of when certi-
fication occurs or the juvenile court is divested of its jurisdiction. 100 The
court has not determined the proper time limits for speedy trial in in-
stances where juveniles successfully transfer cases from adult to juve-
nile court pursuant to Florida Statute § 39.04(2)(e)(4).' 1 At least
three of Florida's five district courts of appeal have held that pendancy
in adult court should not be considered in determining the expiration of
the ninety-day period. 102
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (must enter a written order of extension and cite reasons even
if it is a continuance by defendants).
94. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.220 on General Provisions for Hearings, particularly
subsection (a) which requires the presence of a child, with two exceptions, and subsec-
tion (g) concerning reasonable notice. This rule would appear to prevent ex parte mo-
tions by the state for extending time.
95. See supra note 92.
96. 383 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
97. Id. at 1365.
98. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
99. 337 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1976).
100. Id. at 798.
101. As of July 1, 1981, this is possible only where the child is charged with a
misdemeanor and can show he has not previously been found to have committed two
delinquent acts, one of which is a felony.
102. W.M. v. Tye, 337 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State ex rel.
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal justified this exclusion of
time by suggesting that without it, a juvenile defendant, aware that he
did not meet the statutory requirement of certification as an adult,
could sit back and wait until the ninety days neared expiration before
moving the case back to juvenile court, resulting in inadequate time for
the state to bring him to trial.103 Notwithstanding the remote possibil-
ity defendants would choose this tactic, and concurring with the court's
opinion that the legislature did not intend such procedural "game play-
ing", 1°4 it is nevertheless unfair to exempt the portion of a juvenile's
speedy rights the state consumes with paper-shuffling. It is unlikely
that the juvenile could successfully return to juvenile court unless the
state had originally filed an information erroneously. 05 An extension
could be granted the state if the defendant is shown to be engaging in
the procedural gamesmanship the Fourth District Court envisioned.
The interest of justice would thus be served. This alternative comports
with a literal reading of the statute and rules which dictate the appro-
priate procedure for extensions but do not provide for exclusions of
time. The public interest in a speedy trial need not be overlooked by
either prosecution or defense. Where counsel uses delay techniques
purely for tactical advantage, the court's contempt power may be
brought to bear upon the offending attorney.
Conclusion
Difficult and complex "speedy" dilemmas are too often left to trial
court decision making on issues not adequately addressed by juvenile
rules or statutes. Nowhere is there guidance as to what actions by
juveniles constitute unexcused delay.' 0 6 Nor is there a test of "continu-
Ortez v. Brosseau, 403 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); I.H. v. State, 405 So.
2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
103. 337 So. 2d at 226.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 101. After all, the state is the record-keeper and should
know if the juvenile's prior record meets the statutory requirement.
106. This possibility often arises when a juvenile fails to show for a hearing. But
is any extension of time permitted without the presence of the defendant or defense
counsel in light of the express provisions requiring his presence? See supra note 94.
4531
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ous availability" applicable to juveniles as there is for adults.1", May
the trial court discount speedy time lost to the state when a minor uses
a false name or invalid address to evade service of summons?108 A myr-
iad of other questions remain unanswered.
Some courts justify applying adult criteria used in the criminal
division where juvenile standards are nonexistent. As the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal stated in State v. L.H.,109 "absent legislation, a
juvenile's rights are ordinarily similar to those of an adult." ' In con-
trast, other courts steadfastly maintain the position that juveniles are a
"distinct class of citizens" ' requiring unique treatment.
Since the legislature has provided a statutory mechanism for cer-
tain classes of recidivistic juveniles considered appropriate candidates
for adult treatment,11 2 it seems inappropriate that courts arbitrarily
substitute adult standards for all juveniles whenever explicit case or
statutory authority is lacking. 3 The children remaining within juvenile
jurisdiction should not suffer the spillover effect resulting from public
hysteria over a supposed teenage crime wave. Statistics do not justify
it" 4 nor does essential justice permit it. A comprehensive statutory and
107. See supra note 19.
108. See McKenzie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1244, 1246 n.5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (inference that circumstances such as these would be viewed unfavorably to the
defendant despite lapse of speedy time).
109. 392 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
110. Id. at 296 (citing Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975)).
111. See supra note 18.
112. See supra note 23.
113. The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the state had no appellate
rights with respect to a dismissal on speedy trial grounds since there was no statutory
authority for it. W.A.M. v. State, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 186 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.,
Jan. 13, 1982). Significant in this holding is the court's strict adherence to the principle
of allowing the legislature to enact the laws and the courts to interpret them. Neverthe-
less, for much of the juvenile court's day-to-day decisionmaking there is a woeful lack
of legislative directives.
114. The Uniform Crime Reports accumulated by the United States Department
of Justice from law enforcement agencies across the nation recently released these
figures for the five-year period from 1976 through 1980: Murder arrests for persons
over age 18 increased by 5%; murder arrests for persons under 18 increased by less
than 1%; burglary arrests for adults rose by 15%; burglary arrests for juveniles went
down by 11%; theft/larceny by adults jumped by 18%; theft/larceny by juveniles
dropped 6%; arson by adults was up 34%; arson by juveniles was down 7%; motor
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rule mechanism is needed. Until then, vigilance by the courts in main-
taining a separation of adult and juvenile standards is the only way to
prevent the further erosion of juvenile rights.
Barbara D. Stull
vehicle theft by adults were up 12%; motor vehicle theft by juveniles went down 15%;
overall property crime by adults increased 17%; overall property crime by juveniles
decreased 8%. United States Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports 13, 21,
24, 196 (1980). (Gov't Class. No. J 1.14/7:980).
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